

# The War in Croatia through the Prism of Human Rights<sup>1</sup>

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The conflict in the Balkans is described and analyzed in the light of human rights as they are defined by the international community. The burdens and challenges imposed on Croatia by Serbian aggression and indecisiveness of the international community are delineated. The historical roots and basis for human rights culture in Croatia are defined and the growth of awareness and activity in human rights are followed to present days. The roots of the conflict are found in the ideology of Greater Serbia, its beginning in Kosovo, techniques of genocide and open and systematic breaking of human rights. The strategy of Serbian aggression is separated into five defined spheres. Types of non-Serbian and Serbian refugees and displaced persons are defined and the manner of their human rights deprivations are described.

Editor's note: This paper provides one point of view about the former Yugoslavia, particularly Croatia. It indicates how human rights abuses may be sustained in part by the fomenting of discrepancies between the reality of a situation and the way the situation is perceived.

As one reader has commented: This article represents a statement by an exceptionally well-known defender of peace and human rights. Many of the conclusions are correct and address the practices of Serbian expansion in an entirely realistic way. The author has put on his prophetic persona to put forward a version of history in which the concept of human rights is [itself] used ahistorically.

Croatia is one of the new countries of Europe, a new state of old wishes. It begins its existence by facing 25% of its territory occupied, 500,000 of its people displaced and refugees, 20,000 killed, many of its villages and towns destroyed (Kostović & Judaš, 1992). The occupation disabled the traffic, trade, tourism, electricity supply, mail, and many other things. With 300,000 unemployed (from 4.7 million pre-war inhabitants) the economy is about to collapse. There is general poverty and limited care for the old and sick; there are 20,000 people with handicaps. The mental state of the entire population has been severely stressed by many traumatic events, from air raids, shelling, displacement, and massacres, to hunger and poverty (Klain, 1992). At the same time, Croatia is establishing the basic institutions of a new state: government, parliament, elections, laws, unions,

public institutions and the ownership of industry, houses and land.

The Declaration of the Granting the Independence to colonial countries and people (December 14, 1960) (Centre for Human Rights, 1988) says: "The world proclaims its belief that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that in order to avoid serious crisis an end must be put to colonialism.., it is welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence.., and it is convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory." Together with all new independent states, Croatia took upon itself the burden of carrying into reality the human rights proclaimed 35 years ago (Centre for Human Rights, 1988). But it had also to accept the burden of the past: the conflict of the World War II, in which genocide was a "legitimate" tool of war, and which continued to be legitimate as a part of the after-war "justice" (Jareb & Omrčanin, 1977/1978; Košuta, 1993; and Vuk-Pavlović, 1993).

## Historical Roots of Human Rights in Croatia

The Balkans is not primarily a place of small nations but one of harmonious living of members of the major religions. All major monotheistic religions (Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem, Jewish) meet within the Croatian territory. Still, the attitude of all powers, from Roman times onward, has been a disregard of dignity and human rights of the people who lived in this region. Believing in

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the universality of human rights, hoping for the day when all human beings will be born free and equal in dignity and rights, is here called the Croatian dream. For one thousand years, this was the major reason why these people wanted a state: not to be powerful, not to be a colonial empire, not because of kings or emperors but because of a single goal: human rights for all who lived here.

In modern times, the Croatian search for its concept of human rights stems from two sources. In the 19th century, 100 years before it was accepted by the UN (Centre for Human Rights, 1988) and realized in Croatia, Ante Starčević developed the concept of the right of people to have a state. He maintained that one cannot realize full rights and potentials, including becoming a part of the community of nations, until one's own state is created (Starčević, 1971). The unification of Europe had to evolve from the independence of all its nations; there are no shortcuts or bypasses to it. At the beginning of the century, Stjepan Radić (Radić, 1971) declared human rights for every human being in such a state, and demanded a universal declaration of human rights (Centre for Human Rights, 1988) 50 years in advance. Croatian nationalism that comes out of this concept is Gandhian in philosophy—"Nationalism is the only way to internationalism" (Datta, 1972)—and represents the fulfilment of the second article of the Universal declaration of Human Rights (Centre for Human Rights, 1988): "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms... without distinction of any kind such as... national."

### *World War II—A Tragedy of Lowering of Human Rights Standards*

After World War I, Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian people, who had lived within the Austro-Hungarian empire, had independence for just about 30 days; after that, the international community and many people in the Balkans themselves, believed and hoped that it was better to combine a number of nations into one state. The Serbian state was chosen the first among equals, and another chapter in the colonial history of the Balkans was opened. It did not work.

Between the two wars, both communism and fascism made offers to underprivileged nations; therefore, some of the Croatians supported communism and some fascism. It should be made clear, however, that the enormous majority, more than 90%, supported neither, but followed earlier roots of human rights policy, that of the Croatian

Peasant Party (Boban, 1974). Yet, as we have learned by now everywhere, in critical moments, even a small minority can have a detrimental influence on a whole nation.

There is no pluralism in human rights. Strict respect for human rights is a basic precondition for diversity and effective political pluralism. Fascism permitted itself political victory by lowering already achieved standards of human rights. That is the essence of the tragedy of Hitler's Germany. Human rights are universal and there is no sovereign right to break them.

As a human rights movement, antifascism is one of the first large movements which brought together people regardless of their race, sex, age, nationality, religion, or cultural or political differences. Its results were magnificent and must never be forgotten but continually used as an inspiration and know-how in protection of human rights. On the other hand, as a political movement which led to communism and the spread of the Soviet empire into Eastern Europe, antifascism contained in itself a basis for the breach of human rights. At that time, many people might not have realised it; the monstrosity of Hitler's crimes made it look completely just. But a human rights movement—confronting the abuses of human rights—must never be a movement for power but for the development of civilization which offers a better chance for a power to be just and democratic.

When the Second World War began, Croatians were offered three human-rights approaches. Some nationalists accepted collaboration with Nazi Germany, gaining as a result an independent state but having to accept that the principles of that state would be based on the annihilation of human rights. This created an unbreakable conflict with the entire history of the Croatian wish for a state. Feelings of shame over this group exist up to the present day in the Croatian population, perhaps much more so than in other nations which behaved in a similar manner.

The second group, led by Tito's partisans, while confronting the human rights abuses of Nazis and the German and Italian occupation, used these human rights abuses just as a bite for taking over political power. This led to the mass abuses of human rights which occurred after (but had already started during) the war (Boban, 1974; Jareb & Omrcanin, 1977/1978; Maček, 1992).

The third group, coming from the traditional political movement in Croatia, refused to take the power offered by the Germans (Boban, 1974,

Maček, 1992). When faced with the choice between being the head of state or a prisoner of the Jasenovac concentration camp, V. Maček, the leader of that movement, chose the latter (Boban, 1974; Maček, 1992).

In 1941, German occupation forces performed the genocide of Jews and Gypsies, a precondition for permitting the quasi-independent state of Croatia. The leader of the Croatian people at that time, Vladko Maček, refused. This has never been pointed out internationally. The Ustasha emigrant Ante Pavelic accepted the offer. The racial laws were passed; ethnic cleansing started. In Serbia, genocide of Jews was performed at the same time. Nazis introduced the practice of genocide into the entire area.

### *Postgenocide Genocide*

Simultaneously with genocide, a postgenocide genocide was introduced by giving the rights to the victim nation or group to consider the other group guilty as a whole. When the war ended and Socialist Yugoslavia was established, other dubious measures were introduced: imprecision of scientific data (see below), stimulation of a significant increase of estimates of the number of losers' victims while lowering the significance of the number of victims caused by the winning side (Jareb & Omrčanin, 1977-1978). Bias by courts was accepted at the international level; scientific imprecision was not questioned and thus became the rule (Vuk-Pavlović, 1993).

Maybe the most tragic outcome was the continuation of the concentration camps. They became an accepted technology, especially after the break with Soviet Union. Tragic lowering of moral standards, caused by the pragmatic priorities of the cold war, created a legacy of human rights abuses, up to and including genocide. This was the root of the brutality of the conflicts of the 1990s.

### *Babylonian Truth of the Balkans*

The people in the Balkans who survived World War II came to a tragic recognition of real life—science with its reliable data, and justice, domestic or international, would not restore their human rights. The memory was kept through oral tradition, the most important truths of the area were told from generation to generation without different national, political and regional groups knowing the story about the suffering of the others. The Balkan Babylon of human rights abuses

and suffering was created.

### *Pain of Seventies and Eighties—the End of the Road*

At the beginning of the seventies, a new generation matured, without experience of the war and the post-war era. This generation grew up supported by economic prosperity. Elements of independent thinking were introduced by the development of tourism and by Croatian guest-workers going to the West and elements of political liberalization. At the same time, the political regime rendered itself unable for either autochthonous development or effective pursuit of world development.

The West of the seventies was characterized by a fascinating development of democratic, environmental, women's, disabled and peace movements. Institutions such as Amnesty International, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and "Green" parties were established. Regardless of their political position, left or right, the younger generation in Croatia wanted to participate in these developments in their own country. Leftist and national uprisings of students were inspired by these ideas but were also partly in mutual conflict because of the secrets of the history of their parents. The regime used totalitarian methods in stopping both national and social movements. National movements in Croatia in the early seventies were crushed. The new generation learned that the existing regime did not allow them to join the fascinating movement going on in the West. This was not an abstract political observation; it meant that one's own child or family or one's self would not be permitted to use abilities and desires to live the quality of life that was truly possible. People secretly started joining organizations like Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, church and peace groups, not telling one another of this work. A second Babylon was started, but this time the movement of human rights from the West helped people to learn the language of modern times and open the country to change.

### *The 80s in Croatia*

In 1975 Helsinki happened (Centre for Human Rights, 1988). Human rights were no longer the activity of individual organizations or countries but became a joint European project and a precondition for the new Europe. Helsinki went beyond individual rights, strengthening the rights

all European nations, emphasizing the right to peace and forbidding change of borders by violent means (Centre for Human Rights, 1988).

In Croatia, human rights and nationalist activists were coming out of jails but forbidden to take part in public activities, to write and, often, even to work. In the late eighties, however, it was becoming clear that the system was unsustainable from within and that Yugoslavia was being kept in existence artificially. Radicalization began in the Eastern part: Slobodan Milošević became the dictator of Serbia and abandoned all cover ups and nice words about Serbian interests. He stated the truth: Serbia was not interested in socialism but in national socialism.

### The Era of Milošević

Milošević was willing to take away rights not only from other nations but also from his own. With the support of a significant number of Serbian intellectuals and church officials, he took away the right of the Serbs to respect people of other nationalities, religions and political opinions, and that of other republics of Yugoslavia to follow modern European forms of relationships and development from within. He also stimulated Serbian minorities in other republics and provinces to distance themselves from the majority population, gathering them into tragic groups, which lost the ability to respect other people, their culture, nationality and faith and cherish the countries in which they had homes.

In November 1989, the Berlin wall fell. Human rights work of the 70s and 80s was creating a new Europe. The Trade Union movement of Poland (Solidarity) succeeded in Poland and a direct human rights movement around Havel was taking power in Czechoslovakia. For everyone in Croatia and other Yugoslav states it looked as though the human rights movement had reached a level of strength which met the European standard of human rights.

### Kosovo

In January of the same year, Kosovo miners went on hunger strike 1,000 meters underground, developing a magnificent Gandhian experiment with truth (Lang, 1993). Traditional totalitarian ideologists of all shades, from left to right, panicked, but not Milošević. That was the moment at which he and his advisors came up with key postulates of a new totalitarian movement. Firstly,

when there is no risk of global destruction, Western power structures have no will or tools to prevent or stop armed aggression and war. Secondly, the political will for human rights in Europe and the Helsinki agreements have no means of becoming real. Oppression of human rights of any group of people would not be stopped.

Totalitarian thought had to show that it had a smaller gap between its ideas and practice, that it was more powerful, effective and efficient than European humanism, human rights and democracy. The power of European humanism had to be shamed to its very roots; people had to feel disappointed and betrayed by their leaders and among themselves, from one part of Europe to another. If this was not done immediately, there was a real danger that a democratic and peaceful Europe would become a reality. This totalitarian model of thought, behaviour and methods was first thoroughly analyzed and then implemented in the Third Balkan War (Maček, 1992), from Kosovo to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, against Albanians, Croats, Moslems and Hungarians.

It is important to realize that the conflict was international from its very beginning at Kosovo. The Serbian side had complete control of the media, police, administration and also of the Yugoslav Federal Army. Kosovo was the first place where armed forces were directly used; tanks faced an unarmed group of Albanian miners after eight days of hunger strike.

From that very beginning, the concept of equal guilt, one of the most important techniques for misleading the public, was used. The conflict in Kosovo was presented as an ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs in which both sides were actually primitive and Balkan-like—and the civilized West would be wise not to interfere.

By integrating and manipulating historical and contemporary data, Serbian propagandists created virtual "victimization of Serbian people caused by Albanians," which justified both collective sentence and punishment (Lang, 1993). The same method and techniques would later reach monumental proportions during the Holocaust of the Bosnian Winter (Lang, 1992). From the very beginning, the UN and its agencies showed limitations in pursuing their basic duty. While individuals from all over the world risked their lives to help, the UN and its agencies did not want to risk anything and believed THAT to be the policy adequate in protecting peace, human rights and humanism. Already in Kosovo, a need for overall reorganization of the concepts and networks used by the UN and its

agencies was clearly visible.

Different nations reacted differently to the aggression. Albanian people relied primarily on human rights protests and a plea for international help. Slovenian and Croatian people understood that there was no chance for international help without establishing their own state and defense, while the Moslem people hoped that in their case the West finally understood and would take a stand for them. Thus, attacked peoples never succeeded in developing a joint defense. Their single common belief was that the power of the international community would be more effective on the side of democracy and human rights.

### Aggression

The essence of the conflict in Croatia is a part of the overall strategy of Greater Serbia. It is based on five major strategic points.

#### 1. Transformation of former Yugoslavia into Greater Serbia

Throughout its existence, the former Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbs. This can be clearly documented through analysis of the national structure of key power populations (army professionals, police, foreign service, ruling party membership and bodies, economic management of state companies) in all periods of its existence and in all of its parts. Even though they tried in other fields—such as culture, science, education, health, parts of the economy and other civil sectors—Serbs never succeeded in dominating these fields. In the demographic sector (that is, numerically), there was a clear lowering of overall Serbian participation and in some parts this loss was significant and rapid (with respect to Albanians in Kosovo, and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences used these events to create the so-called "Memorandum," whose basic goal was to use the change of geopolitical times to fulfil the 150-year-old idea of Greater Serbia (Beljo, 1992). It became clear that Serbia would not be able to sustain Serbian domination of Yugoslavia. The European model was becoming too powerful within the state, and non-Serbian nations were becoming stronger and united in their demand for equity. The only way ahead was the dismantling of Yugoslavia.

The international community approached the Yugoslav question with a *status quo* philosophy believing that Serbia was the force of the *status quo*.

But it was not. New Serbian leadership demanded either an increase in Serb domination in existing Yugoslavia or a war for the formation of Greater Serbia. All other nations and republics asked either for a Yugoslavia based on European principles of democracy, human rights and private property, or a peaceful dissolution based on the Helsinki principles of respecting existing borders.

#### 2. Transformation of a Serb-dominated into a Serb-exclusive state

Serbian aggression was performed in four spheres.

First (and foremost) was the growth of fear and of future blackmail. This was accomplished by a demonstration of the ability of the Serbian Army to attack any place and any person in any part of Croatia. It was most clearly manifested through the rocket attack on the Presidential Palace in Zagreb in the autumn of 1991. The entire population was scared at the very beginning of the aggression and up to now has remained fearful of possible future attacks.

Second was the sphere of economic, communication and civilian disfunction. By blocking some key bridges (Maslenica), rivers (Peruća dam) and roads (Zagreb-Belgrade highway), fields for agriculture (Osijek) and energy resources (oil wells near Vukovar), establishing and sustaining normal life in a large part of Croatia was rendered impossible.

The third sphere was that of maximum destruction, expressing itself through looting, genocide, uricide and ecocide. This sphere was (and still is) occupied to a large extent. It is kept for future bargaining with Croatia (areas of Drniš, Pakrac, etc).

The fourth sphere is the intention to become a part of Greater Serbia. Complete ethnic cleansing was performed in these areas. Genocide was performed already during the time of armed aggression, village by village, house by house, family by family, but cleansing was completed after occupation (Baranya, East Slavonia, Plitvice, etc). It is important to point out that a large segment of Serbs did not accept such a policy and many of them had to leave their homes and emigrate as part of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The Greater Serbia-ideology does not believe in the ability of Serbs to live as equals with people of other nationalities and religions.

### 3. All Serbs living in Greater Serbia

This involves two basic stages: first, the genocide, explained in the previous paragraph, and then support for those Serbs from outside of the imagined borders of Greater Serbia to enable them to move inside these borders (e.g., Baranya in Croatia). This is based on the following: the Serbian state will try to occupy and cleanse as large a territory as possible. All Serbs who happen to be outside of this territory must support it by refusing to criticise the regime of Serbia; by creating conflicts and calling attention to any difficulty they might have in the countries in which they were living; by participation, if possible, in armed and terrorist activities, and by propaganda activity worldwide. During the first stage, this had the effect of easing aggression, supporting occupation, and distorting the picture of events. This led to the international concept of the barbarian Balkans, equity in the guilt, equity in consequences, and a hands-off policy (non-intervention).

The Serbian minority in Croatia, as in Belgrade itself, maintains that the Serbs of Croatia started fighting because they were afraid of the new Croatian regime which allegedly looks too much like the one imposed by Ustasas during World War II (Košuta, 1993). This fear, rational or irrational, should be respected and both the Croatian state and the international community must do all that is possible to protect the cultural, ethnic and human rights of Serbs in Croatia. However, it is more than clear that this fear was not the cause of the war nor the reason for the Serbs' intransigence in all attempts to find a peaceful solution with Croatia. On the contrary, from the very beginning of the conflict, Serbs proclaimed a separate state ("Serbian Republic of Krajina") within Croatia, and they lead both the war and peace negotiations from that standpoint. Naturally, with such an ideology, peace cannot be achieved. The key to the conflict in Croatia is not fear but the concept of Greater Serbia. Unfortunately, the same is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Serbia itself, i.e. with Kosovo and Voivodina), and there it will pose the same insurmountable obstacle to peace.

In the second stage, the Serbian people from the surrounding states must move into Greater Serbia to fill it demographically and, while doing so, try to look as if they are being forced to do it by other nations (home states). The concept of Greater Serbia treats Serbs who want to live in mutual respect and dignity with other people in other

states as traitors and actually does not consider them Serbs any longer.

### 4. Destruction of surrounding states and nations

From the moment Serbia gave up on Yugoslavia (before any other republic of the former Yugoslavia did so), it understood that new independent nations would emerge. Thus, it never tried to stop the emergence of the new states but it did all that was possible to cripple them from the beginning. This was done through the spheres of destruction, blockade, and the creation of the displaced and of refugees. Integration into the world community was also (successfully) slowed down, and participation at an international level was considerably thwarted. Such pressure led to internal conflicts and lower quality functioning on all levels in the new states. Internationally, while new states were recognized, their crippling was not prevented, and they were not adequately helped, but very strongly blamed for their own failures and the lower quality of functioning that resulted. The international community blamed the consequences, not the cause. The tragic Moslem-Croat conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the best example. Its thorough analysis, however, will be presented in a separate study (S. Lang, in preparation).

### 5. Securing Serb-dominated Balkans as a part of a new Europe

The international community actually allowed the Serbian regime to strengthen its imperialist position on the Balkans. It was achieved by accepting Serbian aggression, the change of borders and the creation of a new Serbia, and by permitting ethnic cleansing, destruction and disabling of the new states. The failure to identify the aggressor, to support the victims, and to recognize the genocide—and the concept of equal guilt, ethnic conflict and overall barbarism—served as a basis for the establishment of the new order on the Balkans and the new *status quo*. It is comparable to the unacceptable proposal that World War II should have stopped in 1942, that France should have its border at the Western suburbs of Paris and that the ovens of Auschwitz should be viewed primarily as a source of air pollution in Europe.

### The Genocide

As explained, genocide was both the aim and the method of Serbian aggression. If the international

community wants to stop this war, prevent future wars, and analyze war crimes and human rights abuses, it must start in the following way:

1. Clearly identify Serbia as the aggressor with the intention of territorial expansion and national exclusivity in Greater Serbia.

2. Learn that genocide was the strategy and tactics, goal and method of Serbian aggression as well as a basis for the sustaining of Greater Serbia as a state. Greater Serbia can be created or sustained only by continuous reliance on genocide.

3. The four Geneva conventions, earlier conventions designed for a time of war, additional protocols of 1958, the charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other documents of human rights (Centre for Human Rights, 1988), have all been broken. This happened not because of a general difficulty nor the impossibility of respecting human rights in times of war, but because their breaking was a *PART* of the strategy of aggression. Human rights were not broken in relation to individuals but in relation to defined and entire peoples. The message had to be clear: a non-Serb does not have any human rights and nobody in the world is capable of doing anything about it.

### Refugees

While all groups in ex-Yugoslavia have been characterized by displacement and emigration during the war, the decision to move, contrary to popular opinion, was not made freely at any point by any of the groups. Displacement was established through terror, blackmail, denial of basic human rights, hunger and direct physical expulsion which included active participation by the Red Cross, UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and other international community organizations (Lang, 1993). The only way to confront the Serbian strategy of generating refugees as tools/goals of genocide was the adoption of the *Masada strategy*, broadened to include every individual member of society as the defender of Masada. This anti-genocide technique was first applied in Dubrovnik during its siege when 1,700 women refused to be taken out with their children in order to justify the killing of their husbands and fathers (Lang, 1993). Only in the spring of 1993, completely exhausted, hungry, sick, and dying civilians in the siege of Srebrenica again refused to live under conditions which meant death to their dearest and genocide of their people. If almost two years earlier the message of Dubrovnik, which

started a true technique of anti-genocide, had been heard, so much suffering could have been prevented.

Serbian methods used with refugees were as follows:

### *Refugees of Non-Serbian Nationality*

1. Creation of ethnic conflict in the areas intended for occupation.

Before the independence of Croatia, ethnic conflicts occurred exclusively, in those areas which were controlled by the Yugoslav Federal Army (YFA). It was the YFA which had the role of protecting and supporting initiators of the conflicts. Serbian citizens of Croatia could have been pushed into conflicts only as a result of YFA pressure.

2. Virtual agreement of non-Serbs to leave.

Long before the Croatian declaration of independence, ethnic cleansing had begun in the village of Potkonje near Knin, where 138 unarmed Croatian citizens were attacked by the Serbian "paramilitaries" 100 meters away from the YFA, which did nothing to protect them (Lang, 1993). After that, they all had to leave their homes and the territory. After the independence of Croatia, YFA tried to give legitimacy to the cleansing of the occupied territories. In Ilok, in October 1991, the YFA secured the support and presence of EC (European Community) and international representatives in the signing of an agreement that the Croatians had "voluntarily" left their homes, town and territory.

3. Expulsion of non-Serbian people from the occupied territories, permitting the use of any methods, from social pressure to direct killing.

4. Forced fascization of Serbian local populations by blackmail in order to separate them from Croatian neighbours with whom they lived in peace.

5. Expulsion of Serbian people which refused to participate in the genocide.

6. Transfer of Serbian people from other parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia and their encouragement to take the homes of the displaced non-Serbian families.

### Refugees of Serbian Nationality

Serbian refugees from Croatia can be differentiated into several separate groups:

1. Serbian people (mostly women, children and the elderly) which were withdrawn in an organized manner from a certain region in order for them to avoid the subsequent (planned) armed conflict. It was the aggressor who organized the withdrawal, sometimes even forcing it. These people cannot be considered refugees.

2. After the armed conflict, there has been a continuous movement from Serbia to and from occupied territories. This is a demonstration (to the civil community) of the continuous ability of the Serbian army to ensure movement of all people between Serbia and the occupied territories. These groups cannot be considered refugees either.

3. Some of the Serbian people were unwilling to participate in Serbian aggression but nor did they wish to take a clear stand against it. Thus, they have not emigrated to Croatia or foreign countries, but have they for Serbia, trying to hide themselves in the larger Serbian population.

4. Serbian people who refuse not only the occupation, but also the idea of a Greater Serbia as such, have emigrated primarily to the West, cutting themselves off from Serbian policy.

5. Serbian people who have left either for the West or for Croatia, and who, in the footsteps of Willy Brandt and great German humanists, love their own Serbian people to the point of being willing to join the fight to bring down the regime that has caused the war.

6. Serbian people from the Croatian or Bosnian war zones who have been transferred to Serbian occupation zones as a part of the ethnic cleansing necessary for the creation of Greater Serbia.

7. Serbs from free parts of Croatia who supported the formation of Greater Serbia or those who did not have sufficient strength to join the Croatian people in the defence of their common home.

8. Serbian people whose human rights were violated by inadequate behaviour of individual Croatian citizens and authorities.

The classification of refugees is instrumental because just a general approach to them thwarts the understanding of the causes of displacement and therefore facilitates genocide. It also deprives the international community of understanding the true character of the conflict, the forms of aggression and techniques of genocide.

### Instead of a Conclusion

Maybe the most tragic thing for the international community was the fact that proclaiming a part of the land a UN-protected territory made no difference to the continuation and efficiency of the genocide method. Although a complete census does exist for the UN-protected territory, it has not been utilized as a basis for identification of the population and ownership (Čulo, Lang, & Marušić, 1993). This happened because the genocide conventions are strictly aimed at *post festum* activity. One day the world will recognize Dubrovnik women and children as the people who began creating techniques for the prevention of genocide (Lang, 1993). As Mr. J. D'Armesson said in the besieged Dubrovnik in the late autumn of 1991: "This is where the New Europe is being born." New conventions on the prevention of genocide must be adopted, for it is a precondition not only for genocide prevention but also for avoiding misuse of movements to prevent genocide. Such a convention should be called the Dubrovnik Convention.

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